Introduction
Truth commissions are popular mechanisms for assisting post-conflict countries in the transition from violent and divided histories toward democratic and reconciled futures. In the past, the options for addressing gross human rights violations were limited to criminal trials, and in practice, almost no individual trials for human rights violations have proceeded. In such a climate, it would seem that truth commissions offer an acceptable and necessary alternative to leaving the pact of silence and impunity sealed. Advocates of truth commissions view prosecutions of past human rights violations as an inherently flawed method of confronting the past and reconciling a traumatized nation. They argue that trials are expensive, timely and do not achieve the overall analysis that truth commissions accomplish. Moreover, trials are intrinsically focused on the individual perpetrator, whereas conventional truth commissions centre on the victims' perspective. 1 Truth commissions come in varied forms and structures however, at a minimum they all seek to clarify the 'truth', and thereby prevent the violence from being repeated.
Discussions abound regarding the inherent value in knowing the truth, and that this is a necessary and basic step toward healing the wounds of the past and setting a nation on the path towards justice and reconciliation.
2 Through the truth-seeking and investigative phase of a commission, formerly repressed victims of grave human rights violations and other atrocities are finally given the opportunity to be heard. This process is thought to redignify the victims through a formal process and acknowledgment that these horrific acts had indeed taken place. In some cases, truth commissions may open the door for future prosecutions, though there is little evidence of this proposition. 3 Nevertheless, clarifying and making the truth known brings with it a weighty responsibility. The expected result to the truth-telling process is that future generations will be educated and cognizant of their nation's violent history and that these acts will not be repeated. However, truth-telling alone is not an effective deterrent or preventive measure, and it is a feeble substitute for prosecution. 4 Although Guatemala and Peru have different social and political backgrounds that led to tragic and violent histories, both countries elected truth commissions as an instrument of reconciliation. This paper examines and compares the Guatemalan Historical Clarification Commission's mandate and experience to that of the ongoing Peruvian
Truth and Reconciliation Commission's mandate and contends that, although truthseeking is a valuable process, justice in the form of prosecutions must necessarily follow for there to be any meaningful and lasting reconciliation. 
Guatemalan Historical Clarification Commission
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The CEH was tasked with investigating those human rights violations and acts of violence that had occurred between January 1962 and 29 December 1996 -35 years of conflict. It had a very limited timeframe within which to investigate the broad range of human rights violations and acts of violence that occurred over three decades of conflict.
The timetable for the CEH to complete its work was set for six months that could be extended by another six, however, it ultimately required 19 months.
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The Commission was highly restricted in what it could do, as it did not possess any subpoena powers, it had no right to grant amnesty and could not name individual perpetrators.
12 However, it "worked on the premise that restoring the dignity of the victims was a paramount need in Guatemala and that national reconciliation would only be possible on the basis of truth." analysing economic, social and other factors, such as the role and impact of US foreign policy.
(ii) No Individualization or Judicial Effects
The weak mandate of the CEH was not a mistake. 19 Post-conflict Guatemala was still under the stronghold of the right wing military legacy of the past and the CEH had to work within this construct. The Guatemalan military had observed the Truth Commission in neighbouring El Salvador six years earlier name individual perpetrators and would not allow this to be repeated in Guatemala. 20 Therefore, the mandate specifically prohibited the individualization of alleged perpetrators, as well as stating that the work, recommendations and report of the CEH would have no judicial effect or end.
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Although this attribute was criticized, some experts have argued that there was no alternative to the anonymity requirement, and that in effect "naming names" would have undermined the work and credibility of the CEH. 22 The National Reconciliation Law (NLR) enacted on December 19, 1996, was a further reflection of the military's continuing power and influence. 23 The stated aim of the NLR was to reintegrate former URNG combatants into society, and thereby act as a tool of reconciliation, however its practical effect was a blanket amnesty for crimes committed by the State and its agents, as well as the URNG during the armed conflict. 24 Although Professor Tomuschat has conceded that the inability to individualize perpetrators restricted the CEH from, "penetrating to the heart of the evil," it also forced the CEH to have a different approach. 25 The CEH utilized illustrative cases to emphasize different types of violence, thereby providing a broader perspective and analysis. 26 The end result was that the final report looked to the causes of the armed conflict and denounced an entire system. 27 For an ineffectual and 'toothless' truth commission, this had a more biting effect than naming the perpetrators.
(iii) Confidentiality Requirement
Further reflecting the tenuous situation in Guatemala, the CEH was also confined by a high standard of confidentiality. The objective of this was to safeguard witnesses and informants, but from a practical perspective it also served as an incentive for people to come forward and provide their testimonies. In many instances, victims and witnesses of human rights violations and acts of violence felt that international presence lent legitimacy to the CEH. The mixed national and international field teams dispersed throughout the country were thought to achieve a balance between an intimate cultural, Signalling that the pervasive power of the military was still intact, the Guatemalan
Commissioners took an extended leave of the country after the report had been published. 
Justice Remains Elusive
The CEH did not have a justice-seeking component set out in its mandate. In fact, the powers that be in Guatemala made every effort to ensure that domestic prosecutions would not take place. 36 However, it was clear from the moment that the truth was made public to Guatemalans that this was insufficient vindication for the silent suffering they had endured for so long. As one reporter noted:
"As the conclusions (of the CEH's report) were read at a solemn ceremony at the National Theatre, rights workers, relatives of victims and others among the 2,000 people broke into standing ovations, sobs, shouts and chants of 'Justice! Justice!' " 
Peruvian Commission's Composition and Mandate
The TRC was originally to be composed of seven Peruvian nationals designated by the President of the Republic. Further reinforcing the political will to transition from the corrupt and violent past, President Toledo enlarged the TRC to twelve members. 52 As did the CEH, the TRC has regional offices throughout the country equipped with stationary and mobile teams that are conducting interviews, drafting testimonies, investigating cases and disseminating information about the TRC.
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The Peruvian Commission contains five main objectives in its mandate. Briefly summarized, they are to:
• analyse the political, social and cultural conditions, as well as societal and State institutional actions that contributed to the political violence that permeated
Peru; • support the Courts to clarify the crimes and human rights violations committed by the terrorist organizations or by State agents; • try to determine the fate and situation of the victims, and identify in the manner possible, those presumed to be responsible; • elaborate proposals for reparations and dignifying the victims and their families;
• recommend institutional, legal and educational reforms;
• and establish mechanisms to follow up the recommendations. courts, the identification of alleged perpetrators where possible and determining the fate of victims. Whereas, the CEH was forced to turn potentially weak aspects of its mandate into positive results, the TRC has well-defined factors explicitly set forth in its mandate.
The TRC's mandate also positively sets out to re-dignify the victims, while this attribute was an underpinning of the CEH and was only verbalized by its foreign Commissioner.
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The existence and strength of the Peruvian Commission are a testimony to the political climate of change in Peru. The current political will is the strongest factor in favour of the TRC acting as a catalyst in achieving justice and reconciliation in Peru. The following aspects of its mandate reflect the readiness of the government to clarify and make the truth known. Despite this favourable political environment, the TRC's work risks inevitable and potentially devastating shortcomings if the truth it publishes does not convert into a justice-seeking process as proposed by it's mandate.
Acts Imputable To Terrorist Organizations, State Agents Or Paramilitary Groups
According to its mandate, the TRC will focus on the following acts that are imputable to the terrorist organizations, State agents or paramilitary groups:
• Killings and kidnappings;
• Forced disappearances;
• Torture and other grave injuries;
• Violations to collective rights of the Andean communities and indigenous populations;
• Other crimes and grave violations against the rights of persons.
The categories seem to reflect the estimates of the Peruvian Human Rights Ombudsman's Office that the violence resulted in approximately 30,000 deaths at the hands of the guerrilla and State security forces; approximately 4,000-6,000 people were 'disappeared' after being arrested by Security Forces; thousands of people were arbitrarily detained by police and State security forces; and police and army units carried out numerous 56 See supra n. 13. massacres and torture. The violence forced approximately 400,000-600,000 people to flee their villages and they were subsequently displaced.
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In Guatemala, the results of the CEH's interviews and investigations dictated the categories of human rights violations and acts of violence that were documented and this turned out to be one of the strengths of the report. 58 The TRC's categories of imputable acts appear to pre-determine the results, despite the broader 'catch-all' category (e).
Further, the categories do not uniformly distinguish between human rights violations committed by the State and the security forces and acts of political violence or crime committed by the terrorist organizations. 59 This disparity in the mandate could leave the TRC vulnerable to attacks about its credibility if it fails to rectify this in its report.
Further, the failure to enumerate human rights violations and crimes such as arbitrary detention and sexual violence may detract from giving victims of these acts the attention they deserve. If the TRC does not properly highlight and analyse the use of arbitrary detention and sexual violence as strategic tools employed during the period of violence, it may detract from the recommendations for educational, institutional and legal reforms.
As was the case for the Guatemalan Commission, it will be up to the TRC to transform a potentially weak and vulnerable aspect of its mandate into a strong and positive result through its analysis and recommendations.
Public Hearings
Further reinforcing the political will to clarify the truth, the Peruvian Commission's mandate provides for public hearings to take place. The nationally televised hearings in Peru are the first time in the Americas that a truth commission has conducted its truth- In Guatemala, the political circumstances necessitated a high level of secrecy, therefore the silence that accompanied impunity for decades, continued in the quest for truth. Despite indications that 82% of Peruvians supported the creation of the TRC and the military publicly declared its support, the Peruvian Commission is not ignorant of the possible reprisals that airing the horrific truths of the past in public may have. 61 Therefore, there are explicit provisions in the mandate for security measures to be implemented to protect both the victims and witnesses that participate in the TRC, as well as the TRC members themselves.
The TRC is truly a victim-based commission and explicitly holds itself out as a partner of a justice-seeking process. 62 The government's failure to provide access to justice for the victims through a prosecutorial process after such a public truth-telling process will stunt the reconciliation process. The truth, in and of itself, may heal some of the nation's wounds, but it is not enough -accountability is necessary. One Peruvian human rights activist said, "Once we know the truth, we have to make justice. Only then will reconciliation happen. If not, we'll see pockets of resentment that will eventually explode." The Guatemalan experience is confirmation that making the truth known without a commitment to justice is detrimental to the transitional justice process.
TRC's Relationship With The Courts
The Peruvian Commission's mandate explicitly sets out that it will have no jurisdictional qualities and therefore, like the CEH, it has no power to prosecute. However, the mandate also states that the TRC is to support the courts to clarify the crimes and human rights violations committed by the terrorist organizations or the state. 63 This aspect of its mandate sets it distinctly apart from the Guatemalan experience, and is perhaps the strongest factor the TRC can rely on in order to achieve its stated goal of reconciliation for the Peruvian people.
The fragile state of the judicial system in a post-conflict society is a basic argument against a burdensome trial process, and is therefore supportive of the truth-seeking and reconciliation process found in truth commissions. Peru's criminal justice system has not been immune to the effects that two decades of political violence have had on the country. In addition to clarifying the past violence, the televised hearings have shed light on the lack of faith that Peruvians have in the judiciary and the rule of law. 64 / 65 A witness testifying before the TRC in Trujillo expressed: "Justice in Peru is not justice…if there is justice, it is for the rich, not for the poor like me." 66 The TRC should utilize its intrinsic capacity to broadly analyse the period of political violence and help to release the judiciary from the stigma it carries by examining this institution's role and contribution during the years of violence. Further, the Peruvian Commission should make specific recommendations and create the mechanisms to follow these recommendations to build confidence in the rule of law. Failure to instil some level of confidence in the judiciary will mean the TRC's existence will have been for naught, and the publicized truth will be neatly archived with the Human Rights Ombudsman's Office while Peruvians remain in search of justice.
Transitional Justice
On a positive note, it appears that the Peruvian Government is genuine in its support of the TRC's work and has taken concrete steps in that regard. The Attorney General's office has appointed Special Prosecutors to: 1) investigate human rights crimes committed under the Fujimori government; and 2) investigate cases from the 1980s per an agreement with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. 68 Charges have already been filed by the prosecutor investigating crimes committed under Fujimori's reign against the "La Colina" group death squad. The special prosecutor dealing with the cases from the 1980s has the daunting task of investigating and determining criminal responsibility in about 165 cases left pending before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. 69 It would appear that Peru is on the right path and is balancing domestic criminal investigations and prosecutions with its search for truth. Despite the vast amount of work that needs to be done, if the Peruvian authorities approach it in a transparent and inclusive manner, there may be hope for a true transition to a reconciled state that respects the rule of law and human rights.
Conclusions
The question for the victims in countries such as Guatemala and Peru is, what value is there in truth without justice? The failure of any significant progress towards reconciliation and justice is an empty moral promise for the citizens of Guatemala. 70 Granted, the CEH never set out to achieve justice, and this is reflected in its mandate.
However, the Guatemalan Commission primarily sought to re-dignify the Guatemalan people through a truth-seeking process and lay the foundation for national reconciliation. 71 Although the CEH achieved a historical truth, it has fallen far short of re-dignifying the Guatemalan people, and may have inadvertently become an accessory to the continuing repression and impunity against them.
The TRC has literally held itself to a higher goal than the CEH and is a fundamental component of the justice-seeking step towards reconciliation for Peru. The Peruvian
Commission enjoys a political climate that should transform into a judicial process.
However, if not properly addressed, the effects of the political violence on the judiciary and the lack of confidence in the rule of law could result in a similar state of impunity as in Guatemala.
For the international community and advocates of transitional justice, the question is one of ethics and responsibility when crafting policies and mechanisms to aid countries such as Guatemala and Peru in their post-conflict journeys toward reconciliation and respect for the rule of law and human rights. Although the idea of a commission that will investigate, clarify and publish unknown truths and horrors of a nation's past may seem the perfect vehicle to make peace and move toward a reconciled future, it is not a panacea for the post-conflict ills of all nations. The lesson learned from Guatemala is clear -there can be no justice without truth, but truth without justice can be a much more dangerous proposition, as it will only serve to strengthen and perpetuate impunity.
Truth was achieved in Guatemala, and it most certainly will be achieved in Peru.
However, the elusive goals of justice and reconciliation are the determining factors in whether a truth commission will become an accomplice to perpetuating impunity or an agent of transitional justice.
